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THE INFLUENCE OF SOCIAL AND ECONOMIC IDEALS
ON THE LAW OF MALICIOUS TORTS.
HE existence and the alteration of human institutions," says
DICEy, "must in a sense, always and everywhere depend
upon the beliefs or feelings, or, in other words, upon the
opinion of the society in which such institutions flourish."' Undoubtedly, law, as much as any other human institution, has felt this
influence of public opinion. The political, economical and ethical
ideals of a people find expression in their laws. True it is that
public opinion is usually, if not always, in the lead, but in a truly
happy and contented society the distance is never great. As MAIN4
says, in progressive societies "it may be laid down that social necessities and social opinions are always more or.less in advance of the
law. We may come indefinitely near to the closing of the gap between them but it has a perpetual tendency to reopen. Law is
stable; the societies we are speaking of are progressive. The greater
or less happiness of a people depends on the degree of promtitude
2
with which the gulf is narrowed."
According to Dicgy, this is less true of judge-made law than of
statutes. .Three reasons are assigned for this conclusion, (i) that
judicial legislation, more than the enactments of the law-giving
body, aims at the maintenance of the logic or symmetry of the law;
that it aims at securing the certainty, rather than at amending
(2)
the deficiencies of the law; and (3) that, because of the age and
-training of our judges, the ideas of expediency or policy accepted
by the courts may differ materially from the ideas "which, at a
gengiven time, having acquired predominant influence among the
3
eral public," guide the legislative body in making the statutes. Had
he been writing with regard to our country instead of England, he
might have added as a fourth reason, the peculiar influence which
our express constitutioial separation of -powers-legislative, judicial and executive-may have upon our judges. It is not strange
that under such a constitution judges should give more weight to
precedent and consistency in reaching conclusions, even when they
feel that such conclusions are not in accord with modem thinking,
than they would under a system of government where the division
between judicial and legislative powers is not so clearly marked. The
6U ri

.

IDicey, Lectures on the Relation Between Law and Public Opinion in England
During the Nineteenth Century, p. 1.
2 Maine, Ancient Law, p. 23.
3
Dicey, Idem, pp. 36o.376.
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natural result of such an expfess division of powers is to make the
judiciary slov to render decisions which cause a marked change in
the interpretation of laws and so have the practical effect of legislation-it has a tendency to compel care on the part of the judges lest
they encroach upon the domain of the legislative body.
Conceding that these reasons are effective and that judge-made
law is less likely than statute law to be representative of public ideals
and opinion, there is one very pertinent reason why this should be
less true here than . in England. In four-fifths, or more, of our
states the judiciary is chosen periodically by popular election. Even
though we may deplore this condition, we must concede that this
method of choice affects the judge in like manner as it does the legislator, i. e., it tends to make his decisions coincide with public opinion in his section of the country. The different view-points of the
typical English and American judges on this matter iswell illustrated by the following quotations. Justice PARK, in his opinion in
Mirehouse v. Rentzell,4 said, "Our common law system consists in
thi applying to new c6mbinations of circumstances those rules of
law which we derive from legal principles and judicial precedents;
and for the sake of attaining uniformity, consistency and certainty,
we must apply those rules, where they are not plainly unreasonable
and inconvenient, to all cases which arise; and we are not at liberty
to reject them, and to abandon all analogy to them, in those to which
they have not yet been judicially applied, because we think that the
rules are not as convenient and reasonable as we ourselves could
have devised. It appears to me to be of great importance to keep
this principle of decision steadily in view, not merely for the determination of the particular case, but for the interests of law as a science." Here the emphasis is laid on uniformity and consistency.
Compare with this the following extract from the opinion of Justice
ELIoTT in Tuttle v. Buck,5 "It must be remembered that the common
law is the result of growth and that its development has been determined by the social needs of the community which it governs. It is
the resultant of conflicting social forces, and those forces which are
for the time dominant leave their impress upon the law. It is of judicial origin, and seeks to establish doctrines and rules for the determination, protection, and enforcement of legal rights. Manifestly
it must change as society changes and new rights are recognized.
To be an efficient instrument, and not a mere abstraction, it must
gradually adapt itself to changed conditions. Necessarily its form
4x

CI. and Fin. 527-S46.

z zo7 Minn. 145, 148.-
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and substance have been greatly affected by prevalent economic
theories." In this statement it is the adaptability to social needs that
is emphasized. We may be, then, not unwarranted in expecting to
find the decisions of our courts reflecting with a greater or less degree of faithfulness the economic and social ideals of the public.
Will an examination of the American decisions on some one
branch of the law justify this conclusion? Let us seek the answer
to this question by a thorough consideration of the law of malicious
torts. This particular subject is chosen for the field of our investigation for two reasons, first, because the law respecting it is almost
entirely the product of judicial decision, and, second, because within this division of the field of law falls a large proportion of 'the
cases dealing with business competition and the use of the boycott
in disputes between labor and capital. These two questions are the
subject of present public interest and a prolific source of recent litigation. 'Consequently the law relating to both of these matters
has been developed largely within the last decade, and promises large
future development, and for this reason, alone, is well suited to our
purpose.
Before entering upon the investigation suggested it is necessary
to determine what the public economic and social idealsof our peo-.
,ple have been since our national existence began. As is usual with
a young and developing country, rich in natural resources and full
of opportunities, we were, during the first century of our nationarl
existence, an intensely individualistic people. We were strong believers in non-interference on the part of the government with individual freedom of action. As has been suggested" this freedom of
action was interpreted as the freedom of action of those in control
and unrestrained opportunity to acquire wealth. There was manifested the usual tendency of an individualistic people-a tendency
toward absolute rights, both personal and of property. In one re-spect, at least, we were inconsistent in our belief, for we began early
to foster the manufacturing industry by means of a protective tariff..
But as a nation, until recent times, we may be said to have subscribedf
to the individualistic doctrine of unlimited and unrestrained competition within our own boundaries. Our experience has been the common experience of all peoples which have adhered to-this theory-.
we have foulid that when allowed to go on unrestrained and un-limited competition tends to combination and combination, to monopoly, at which point the benefits of competition are eliminatedAndrew Alexander Bruce-Lassez Faire and the Supreme Court of the United!
States, 2o Green Bag 546, S49.
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In recent years we have reached a stage in our economic thinkingwhere we do not regard unlimited competition as a necessary, or
even desirable condition. It is now quite generally recognized that
limits must be placed on competition if we are to enjoy its beneficial
elements. As one writer on economics has expressed it, it is now
regarded as one of the functions of government to "raise the ethicar
level of competition. ' 7 Few, if any, rights are now recognized ai.
absolute. In short, we are coming more and more to measure our
approval or disapproval of acts by the effect they have upon society
as a whole, and public opinion is fast approaching a §tage where it
will no longer approve an act which though beneficial to the individ-ual is detrimental to society.
The body of the law of malicious torts is not a new development.
As far back as the time of Justinian the Roman law provided that
one might dig a well on his own land and incur no liability even.
though he tapped the vein which fed his neighbor's well and thereby
diminished or destroyed his neighbor's water-supply, provided theact were not done for the purely malicious purpose of injuring his.
neighbor." The English courts have not been so ready to consider
the motive with which an act is done as of consequence.in affecting
the injured party's right of action. Consequently they have held that
a landowner has a right to sink wells on his own land and may do
so without incurring liability even though his motive is solely to.
diminish, pollute or destioy the water-supply in wells on neighboring
property and his act accomplishes that result." The question of theeffect of a malicious motive to render one liable for inducing a breach
of contract has caused the English courts no little trouble.10 flut
the law now seems to be that "a violation of a legal right committed
knowingly is a cause of action and.. . it is a violation of a legar
right to interfere with contractural relations recognized by law if
there be no sufficient justification for the interference."" In one of
the cases on this subject, Allen v. Flood, 2 there is dictum to the effect that an act otherwise legal could not be made unlawful because'Henry Carter Adams-The Relation of the State to Industrial Action, Publications;
of the American Economic Assn., Vol. x, No. 6, Jan., 1887, pp. 507, 508.
. Digest-39.3.21;

also 39-31-12.

' Mayor, etc. of Bradford v. Pickles (895), 64 L. J. Rep. (Ch.) 759.
10Lumley v. Gye (1853), . El. & BL 2r6; Bowen v. Hall (881), 6 Q. B. Div. 3333
Mogul Steamship Co. v. MacGregor (z889), 23 Q. B. Div. 598; Temperton v. Russell
[1893], z Q. B. 7s; Flood v. Jackson [1895], 2 Q. B. 21; Allen v. Flood, [1898J
A. C. x; Quinn v. Leathem, [9o] A. C. 495; Read v. Friendly Society, etc., [s9o2
2 K. B. 732; Glamorgan Coal Co. Ltd. et al. v. South Wales Miners' Federition, ct al.,
[1903] 2 . B. 545.
uQuinn v. Leathem, supra.
"[88]
A. C. i.
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8
it was actuated by malice. According to a later -authority' no more
was meant by the judges in their opinion in Allen v. Flood than that
"an act which does not amount to a legal injury cannot be actionable
4
because it is done with a bad intent." A more recent case bears
-out this statement of the law.
In America the cases on no division of the law of malicious torts
are altogether harmonious. The majority of cases involving the
-question of the right of an owner of land to dig a well thereon with
the malicious intent of injuring his neighbor's water-supply decide
that such conduct constitutes an actionable tort if the plaintiff suffers
5
In cases where a fence or other obstruction
.substantial damage.'
is erected on the property of one person for the sole purpose of inj'bring and annoying his neighbor the weight of authority is against
.allowing a recovery by the person whose light, air or view is thereby cut off.' 8 The legislatures of some*states have passed statutes
to the owner of the prop:making the erection of structures, useless
1
,erty and for such a purpose, actionable.'
,It seems to be the law-of the American cases that one may not
induce others not to trade with a third person when the sole pur:pose of such act is to injure the third person and that one who does
such an act is liable to the person injured for the damage which
Is Lord Macnaughten in Quinn v. Leathem, supra.
Session Cases (1907) 256.
Stillwater Water Co. v. Farmer (1903), 89 Minn. 58, 93 N. W. 9o7; same case
Barclay
4(<904), 92 Minn. 230, 9 N. W. 882; Villiams v. Ladew (1894). 16x Pa. St. 283;
-v. Abraham (1903), 12X Iowa 6i9, 96 N. W. xo8o; Chesley v. King (1882), 74 Me. 164;
Gagnon v. French Lick Springs Hotel Co. (1904), x63 Ind. 687, 72 N. B. 849; Wyandot
the
<AClb Co. v. Sells (1895), 3 Ohio N. P.'210; Still other. cases are to the effect that
-use of underground, surface and percolating waters must be reasonable and these juris.dictions certainly would not hold that one can diminish or destroy his neighbor's waterLupply without rendering himself liable for the damage so caused, where the sole purpose
-of the inflictor is to injure his neighbor; see Swett v. Cutts (1870), 5o N. H. 439;
7Z
Bassett v. Salisbury Mfg. Co. (1862), 43 N. H. 569; Franklin v. Durgee (19ox),
.N. H. 186; Forbell v. City of New York (igoo), 164 N. Y. 522; Katz v. Walkinshaw
(1903), 141 Cal. 116; Cohen v. La Canada Land & Water Co. (1904). x4z Cal. 437;
-opposed to this view are the following cases Chatfield v. Wilson (1856), 28 Vt. 49;
Huber v. Merkel (1903), 117 Wis. 355, 94 N. W. 3S4.
WHolding that it is an actionable wrong: Flaherty v. Moran (18go), 81 Mich. 52;
Kirkwood v. Finegan (z893), 95 Mich. 543; Smith v. Speed (19o), xx Okla. 95, (not.
"in the higher court on this question). Contra: Metzger v. Hochrern (1900), 107 Wis.
267; 83 N. W. 308, 5o L. R. A. 305; Bordeau v. Greene (1899), 22 Mont. 254; Letts v.
Parr
-Kessler (x896), 54 Ohio St. 73; Guest v. Reynolds (1873), 68 I1. 478; Adler v.
Pickard
(9ox), 34 N. Y. Misc. 482 (by inference though not necessary to decision);
-v. Collins (x856), 23 Barb. 444; Ransom v. McCallister (887), 9 Ky. L. R. 495; Saddler
-v. Alexander (1900). 21 Ky. L. It. 1835; the Kansas cases lead one to believe that the
X ansas courts would also take this view of the question, Falloon v. Schilling (x883),
=9 Kan. 292; Triplett v. Jackson (1897), 5 KM App. 777, 48 Pac. 93r.
IT Connecticut, Maine, Washington, Vermont, Massachusetts, and New Hampshire.
14Brown v. Magistrates, etc. of Edinburgh et al. (x9o6),
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he may suffer therefrom.1 8 The same rule applies in cases where
the defendant induces the discharge of an employee" or induces
workmen to leave their employment. 20 In a recent case it has been
decided that one who established a barber shop, employed a barber
to carry on the business, and used his personal influence to attract
customers from a neighboring shop, for the sole purpose -of injuring
his neighbor by ruining his business, and succeeded in doing so, is
liable to the neighboring barber for the injury so resulting.21
There are many other American cases on the subject of malicious
torts and not within the classes mentioned. It would be a repetition:
of work done, however, to attempt an exhaustive collection of them.
Many collections of cases and articles on this subject have appeared
during recent years and are of inestimable value to a student of the
subject.22 The general conclusion of all the recent writers on this
subject seems to be that, if it has not always been so, the law now,
at least, is that one who with the sole intent of injuring another and
IBErtz v. Produce Exchange (9oo),
79 Minn. 140, 8z N. W. 737, 48 L. R. A. go;
Lohse Patent Door Co. v. Fuelle et aL (19o8), 215 MO. 421, 114 S. V. 997; Klingel's.
Pharmacy v. Sharpe & Dohme et al. (rgo6), 104 Md. 218, 64 At. 1029, 7 L. R. A.
(N. S.) 976; Graham v. St. Charles St. R. R. Co. (895), 47 La. Ann. 214 and 1656;
Crump v. Commonwealth (x888), 84 Va. 927; Delz v. Winfree, Normari & Pearson et
al. (8gx).
8o Tex. 4oo; Olive Sternenberg v. Van Patten et al. (1894), 7 Tex. Civ.
App. 63o; Moores & Co. v. Bricklayers'- Union et al. (1899), 23 Ohio Wk. Bul. 48.
1o Ohio Dec. (Reprint) 665.
Contra: J. F. Parkinson Co. v. Building Trades Council
(igo8), - Cal. -, 98 Pac. 1027; Guethler v. Altman (1go1), 26 Ind. App. 588, 6o N. E.
355; Heywood v. Tillson (1883). 75 Me. 225.
29 Chipley v. Atkinson (z887), 23 Fia. 2o6; Huskie v. Griffin (igog), N. H. -,
74 AtI. 595; Erdman v. Mitchell (1903), 207 Pa. St. 79, here the immediate purpose of
the persuasion or coercion was to secure the discharge of non-union men in order to
result remotely in strengthening the union; see also Plant v. Woods (1900), 276 Mass.
492. Contra: National Protective Assn. of Steam Fitters & Helpers v. Cumming:
et al. (1902), 170 Nq. Y. 315.
"Walker v. Cronin (z871), 1o Mass. 555.
2"Tuttle v. Buck (1909), 107 Minn. 145; but see, Passaic Print Works v. Ely &
Walker Dry Goods Co. et al. (igoo), 1o5 Fed. Rep. 163.
"2 William It. Hodge-Wrongful Interference by Third Parties with the Rights of'
Employers and Employed-28 Am. L. Rev. 47.
F. P. Walton-Motive as an Element in Torts in the Common and in the Civiv
Law-22 Harv. L. Rev. 5ox.
J. B. James-How Far an Act May Be a Tort Because of the Wrongful Motive"
of the Actor-s8 Harv. L. Rev. 411.
Henry T. Terry-Malicious Torts-2o Law Quart. Rev. so.
William Draper Lewis-Should the Motive of the Defendant Affect the Questiom
of his Liability?-The Answer of one Class of Trade and Labor Cases-5 Col. L.
Rev. 1o7.

Jeremiah Smith-Crucial Issues in Labor Litigation-2o Harv. L. Rev. 253-279,.
345-362 and 429-453.

The effect of bad motive is taken up at page 451, et seq.

Maliciously Inducing a Breach of Contract-2 Mich. L. Rev. 305.
Effect of Bad Motive to Make Actionable What Would Otherwise not Be.-Note,
'62 L. R. A. 673.
Interference with Contractual Relations-Note, 8 Col. L. Rev. 496.
Motive Affecting Legality of Competition-Note, 9 Col. L. Rev. 455.
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without any benefit to himself does an act which results in injury to
such other person is liable to the person so injured. In many cases
-the judges in their opinions have enunciated the principle that "the
commission of a lawful act is not actionable though it proceeded
from a malicious motive," or sometimes stated "an act which is
lawful in itself cannot be made actionable because of the motive
which induced it," or "where one exercises a legal right only, the
28
With the actual results
-motive which actuates him is immaterial.1
quarrel, but such a
no
has
one
cases
these
of
all,
not
in many, if
statement of the general principle is misleading and, for that reason,
-dangerous. If by these statements is meant, simply, that an act,
which one may do at any time, under any circumstances and with any
-motive, may be done without incurring liability where the intent of
the inflictor is solely to injure another, no one will disagree, for the
-premises assume that the right exercised is absolute and the statement becomes a.mere truism. But if the interpretation of such statements is that any right which one may exercise where his object is
to benefit himself materially even though in its exercise he injure
Ihis neigllbor, may be exercised' to the injury of another where the
sole purpose of the person so exercising it is to injure the other, then
it is rhanifestly incorrect. If the right is absolute, this latter statement is, of course, true, as by definition an absolute right is one which
may be exercised under any condition. We recognize, however,
-very few, if any, rights as being absolute, and the principle as stated
above is likely to be incorrectly applied to rights that are not absolute
-with disastrous effects as regards the justice of -the law.
How do these various lines of cases reflect public opinion? As
suggested, one of the characteristics of individualistic thinking is
a tendency to regard rights as absolute. The influence of this tendency is clearly traceable in the decisions involving the law of mali.cious torts. By far the majority of the cases before 1890,24 and a
25
-number of the later ones were decided on the basis that the rights
in question were absolute, or if not absolute, that the limitations on
them should not be extended as logic required. A good illustration
225;
2' Raycroft v. Tayntor (x896), 68 Vt. 219, 54 Am. St. Rep. 882, 33 L. R. A.
28 Pa. St. 176;
Jenkins v. Fowler (185), 24 Pa. St. 308; Fowler v. Jenkins (1857),
N.
Glendon Iron Co. v. Uhler (1874), 7S Pa. St. 467; Thornton v. Thornton (869), 63 v.
444; Phelps
Car. 211; Auburn & Cato. Plank Road Co. v. Douglass (84), 9 N. Y.
Metzger v. HochNowlen (1878), 72 N. Y. 39; Chatfield v. Wilson (856), 28 Vt 49;
-rein (xgoo), 107 Wis. a67; Huber v. Merkel (2903), 117 Wis. 3S3.
Payne v.
26Phelps v. Nowlen, supra; Mahan v. Brown (1835), 23 Wend. 261;

Westexn & Atlantic R. R. Co. (884),

23

Lea (Tenn.)

507.

26 Ind. App. 587, 6o
Metzger v. Hochrein. supra; Guethler v. Altman (19o),
Wis. -,
I. X. 355; Boyson v. Thorn (1893), 98 Cal. 578; lIoehr v. Dickson (igpo), A24 N. W. 293.
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of this is furnished by the case of Phelps v. Nowlen; 26 the defendant
in this case had on his land a mineral spring about which there was
an embankment formed by the action of the water and by artificial
means. The plaintiff dug a well on his land and struck a vein of
mineral water; he then laid a pipe and conducted the water to a
bath-house and fountain. The defendant supposing that there was
some connection between his spring and the well of the plaintiff
with the sole intent of injuring plaintiff by diminishing his wateisupply dug a ditch through the embankment about his spring. This
resulted in lowering materially the water-supply in plaintiff's well,
thereby cutting off the supply of water to the plaintiff's bath-house
and fountain. The lower court found, "that the defendant had an
absolute right to dig the ditch and lower the spring on his own land
. . . and that with whatever motive he acted, he invaded no legal
right of the plaintiff in so doing." The higher court sustained the
decision of the trial court. Judge MILLER in his opinion said, "While
the law does not allow an owner to erect on his own land, near the
house of another, structures for carrying on an unwholesome and obnoxious trade, which may poison the air and constitute a nuisance
that interferes with a proper enjoyment of the property of an adjoining owner, and does not permit a person, in any form, to disturb a legitimate use of another's property, it also does not interpose its shield for the protection of such owner in what does not actually belong to him." Here it is evident that the judge while recognizing that the right of the owner of property to use it as he sees
fit is not absolute, but is limited in that he may not use it to carry
on an "unwholesome or obnoxious trade" that may interfere with
a proper enjoyment of the property of an adjoining neighbor, refuses
to extend the limitation of the right of property so as to deny the
owner thereof the right to dig a ditch thereon, which does himself
no good and injures his neighbor quite as seriously as would be the
case were he to engage on his land in an obnoxious trade. It is as
logical, certainly, to extend the limitation to refusal to allow the destruction of a water-supply as to the pollution of the air. But Justice MILLER'S decision is quite in accord with the tendency, until
recently evidenced by public opinion, to regard one's right to property as absolute-to consider that the owner should be allowed to
use it as he desired even though he derived, or intended to derive,
no benefit or pleasure from such use and did cause inconvenience
and damage to his neighbor,
In another case, Payne v. Western & Atlantic Railroad-Company,1
2672 N. Y. 39.

2 13 Lea (Tenn.) So7.
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the defendant published a notice to employees threatening to discharge any of them who should trade with the plaintiff. The order
was made for the sole purpose of injuring the plaintiff. This resulted in a severe loss of trade to the plaintiff and he sued the defendant to recover the damages suffered. In this opinion Justice
INGiRSoLL said, "The only act complained of is the notice to hands
that they will be discharged if they trade with the plaintiff. This,
being merely the exercise of an undoubted right by defendant, cannot give plaintiff a right of action, even though the act was maliciofisly done, and the plaintiff suffered injury therefrom." It is evident here that the judge regarded the right to induce workmen,
by means of threats or persuasion, to cease trading with the plaintiff
as an absolute right to be exercised at any time, under any circumstances and with any motive without incurring any liability. This
same general tendency to regard rights as absolute is evidenced by
28
It is one of the expressions of the individa great number of cases.
ualistic system of thinking.
Another characteristic of this system of thought is reverence for
any act which bears the form of business competition. This is true
whether the act or acts in question constitute what economists designate as competition or whether they are simply malicious interference
with the business of another masquerading .as competition. One of
the best examples of this view is furnished by the 29case of Passaic
Print Works v. Ely & Walker Dry Goods Companry. The plaintiff
in this case was a corporation engaged in manufacturing prints or
calicoes. The defendant was a wholesale dry-goods corporation and
for the sole and malicious purpose of injuring plaintiff's business
issued a circular to plaintiff's customers advertising to sell prints
manufactured by the plaintiff at a price very much below that at
which the plaintiff sold them. The result was to greatly injure plaintiff's business by destroying its trade, and for the damage suffered
plaintiff sued the defendant.. The court, Judge SANBORN dissenting,
held that the plaintiff could not recover. In his opinion Judge
3
THAYlR said, " "No one can dispute the right"of the defendant company to offer for sale goods that it owned and were in its possession,
whether- the quantity was great or small, for such price as it deemed
proper. This was the outward visible act of which complaint is
made, and, being lawful, the law will not hold it to be otherwise because of a secret purpose entertained by the defendant company to
28See cases cited under note No. 23; also Heywood v. Tillson (1883),
Guethler v. Altman, supra; Loehr v. Dickson, supra.
20 (igoo) xos Fed. 163.
30Page. 167.

75 Me.

225;
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inflict loss on the plaintiff by compelling it to reduce the cost of a
certain kind of its prints or calicoes." The court's position here
clearly is that the defendant having the right to sell goods, which it
owns, at any price it chooses where its purpose is simply to attract
customers to itself, or to turn the goods into money, or some other
such legitimate purpose where the immediate motive is to materially
benefit itself, has the same right to sell where its motive is solely
to injure and damage the defendant. This is, in substance, saying'
that in business whenever acts take the form of competition they are
not to be interfered with even though they injure another and render
no immediate benefit to the inflictor. Again this is but another manifestation of the doctrine of absolute rights-one has a right to sell
goods which he owns where his motive is to benefit himself, so he
has the right to do so no matter what his motive. It is a contradiction to denominate such acts competition. One of the necessary elements of business competition is an intent on the part of the one doing the act or acts to advance or benefit his business.
In a great many of the more recent cases the courts have recognized that few, if any, rights are absolute and that many rights which
have in the past been regarded as absolute must be limited for society's benefit."' In Gagnon v. French Lick Springs Hotel Company,3 2 which was an action by the complainant for an injtinction
against the defendant to restrain defendant from pumping large
quantities of water from a well on his own land for the sole purpose
of injuring the plaintiff, Judge DOWLING in his opinion said, "The
strong trend of the later decisions is toward a qualification of the
earlier doctrine that the landowner could exercise unlimited and irresponsible control over subterranean waters on his own land, without regard to the injuries which might thereby result to the-land of
other proprietors in the neighborhood. Local conditions, the purpose for which the landowner excavates or drills wells on his land,
the use or non-use intended to be made of the water, and other like
circumstances have come to be regarded as more or less fnfluential
in this class of cases, and have justly led to an extension of the maxim, 'Sic utere tuo iut ilienum non. laedas,' to the rights of landowners over subterranean waters, and to some abridgment of their supposed power to injure their neighbors without benefiting themselves."
Judge ELLIOTT applies this same view of the necessity of limiting
n Delz v. Winfree, Norman & Pearson et al. (i89!), 8o Tex. 400; Klingel's
Pharmacy v. Sharp & Dohme (x9o6), 104 Md. 218; Gagnon v. French Lick Springs
Hotel Co. (1904), 163 Ind. 687, 72 N. F. 849; Huskie v. Griffin (igog), - N. H. -.
74 Atl. 595; Thacker Coal & Coke Company v. Burke et al. (x9o6), 59 W. Va. 253.
53 S. F. x6z; Willner v. Silverman et al. (1909), iog Md. 341, 7z At]. 962.

3163 Ind. 687.
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absolute rights to a different situation. In his opinion in Tuttle v.
Buck,3 3 he says, ".The principle that a man may use his own property according to his own needs and desires, while true in the abstract, is subject to many limitations in the concrete. Men cannot
always, in civilized society, be allowed to use their own property as
their interests and desires may dictate without reference to the fact
that they have neighbors whose rights are as sacred as their own.
The existence and well-being of society require that each and every
person shall conduct himself consistently with the fact that he is a
social and reasonable person. The purpose for which a man is using
his property may thus sometimes determine his rights." Both of
these quotations evince a tendency on the part of the judges to look
primarily to the 'welfare of society rather than to the advancement
of individual interests at the expense of society. Other cases indicate that the courts are gradually coming to take this view, i. e., that
the rights of the individual are not to be regarded as absolute but are
rather to be limited where the limitation results in a benefit to so84
ciety as a whole.
In other words, the courts of this country are coming to adopt the
view that the answer to the question, may one, without incurring
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most certain way of avoiding difficulty and conflict in cases of this
sort is the adoption of the rule that where one is injured or damaged by the act of another, he is entitled to be recompensed therefor, unless the said damage is caused by the exercise of an absolute
right of the inflictor or unless the purpose sought to be accomplished
by such act justifies it, i. e., is reasonable. This rule or an approach
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Co., 163 Ind. 687;
" Tuttle v. Buck, supra; Gagnon v. French Lick Springs Hotel
(z9o3), 207 Pa. St. 79.
Stillwater Water Co. v. Farmer, 89 Minn. 58; Erdman v. Mitchell
83 35
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exception." In this statement Judge SANBORN approaches a statement of the rule suggested as a way out of the difficulty. It should
not be confined to injuries to one's "business, profession, or occupation," but extended so as to embrace injuries to any right, including
what Mr. Terry38 denominates "the right of pecuniary condition."
An adoption of this rule, with the courts determining the reasonable-.
ness of the act causing the injury by comparing its effect on society
with the effect of the injury thereby caused, would remove many
of the difficulties in the law of malicious torts and would undoubtedly
secure more just results in cases involving this law. The adoption
of this rule would mean the recognition of fewer absolute rights, and
these would be those, the recognition of which according to our present economical and social ideals seem beneficial to society, as for
instance the right to use the courts to enforce a just claim even
though in special instances they may be made use of to annoy rather
than for the purpose of collecting the claim.
The conclusion, then, which one may justly draw from an examination of the cases along this branch of the law, is that the courts
are generally following public opinion in this regard. To be sure,
there are recent instances, and perhaps too many of them, where the
courts apparently still cling to the old individualistic way of thinking.3 7 These instances seem to be becoming fewer each year, however, and we may expect to see our decisions in the immediate future
approaching more nearly the public ideals.
It is interesting to consider what the result would ber if the rule
suggested were followed out logically in cases where trusts, large
corporations or combinations of corporations, attempting to gain control and secure a monopoly of the business in some one line, seek
to destroy independent corporations engaged in the same line of business. In the labor cases involving motive, the courts have drawn a
distinction between what they term the "immediate" and the "ultimate" motives of the inflictor of the injury. By "immediate" motive
is meant the immediate result which is desired to be accomplished by
the act. The "ultimate" motive is the result which the inflictor
wishes to accomplish not by the act itself but by that act as one of a
series of acts. To illustrate, suppose a labor union, some of whose
members are employed by a manufacturer, who also employs nonunion men, orders him to discharge the non-union men and threatens
to compel its men to quit work if he does not comply with the order.
To avoid a strike he discharges the non-union men. Here the imme3 20 Law Quart. Rev. x4.
n Loehr v. Dickson, Huber v. Merkel, and Metzger v. Hochrein, all supra.
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diate result desired is the injury-the discharge-of the non-union
men. It'may very well be that the ultimate motive is to force all
laborers to join the union and thus to increase its power and usefulness. It may be stated as a general rule that in labor cases the courts
have not regarded the ultimate motive of the defendants in deter38
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mining their liability.
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a trust where the trust has cut prices so as to lose money in the district where it competes with the independent company, in order to
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an action unless the acts are justified; the right to sell goods is not
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is not excused from liability; in considering the motive, the immediate motive alone will be regarded; but in this case the immediate
motive of the trust is the injury of the plaintiff company and the
immediate result, even to the defendant, is a loss; therefore the defendant, the trust, is liable in damages to the plaintiff, the independent concern, for the injury caused. There was a time when the
public reverence for competition would have insured a different result. Had the .question of the justification of the act been raised,
it would have been answered by the statement that the acts were
done under competition and so were justified, it being considered
dangerous to the public welfare to restrict competition. As has
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combination, is an increase and maintenance of prices above the
level which they occupied when the price cutting began. If public
opinion reaches the stage where it recognizes that competition ought
to be so limited as to prohibit such acts, what will the result be?
As explained, the way is open. If our judges regard public opinion,
revolutionary as it may seem, will they not reach the result suggested above?
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